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[8. 11'. No. 17387. In Bank. June 2, 1947.J 
of WILLARD E. KAY, an Incompetent Person. 
WILLARD E. KAY, an Incompetent Person, etc., Pe-
titione!', v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE 
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., 
Respondents. 
Guardian and Ward - Sale of Ward's Property - Oonflrma-
tion.-A guardian's sale is not effective until it is confirmed 
by the probate court. (Prob. Court, §§ 785, 1534.) 
Id.--Oertiorari.-A determination whether there is sufficient 
evidence on which to base an order confirming a guardian's 
, sale lies within the discretion of the probate court, and that 
. determination is not reviewable on certiorari. 
Oourts - Superior Oourts - Jurisdiction.-Although the pro-
cedure and jurisdiction of the superior court sitting in probate 
are limited by the provisions of the Probate Code, and in that 
sense "limited and special," the court is not an inferior tri-
... bunal of limited jurisdiction. bnt remains a court of general 
jurisdiction. 
Insane Per80ns-Guardianship--Sale of Property of Ward-
Oonflrmation of Sale.-The evidence supported a finding of 
the probate court that a guardian's sale of the home property 
of an incompetent ward was for the best interests of the 
ward, where it was shown that a good price, the best obtain- I 
See 13 OaI.Jur. 182; 25 Am.Jur. 84. 
Dig. References: [1] Guardian and Ward, § 76(3); [2,9] 
and Ward, § 90; [3] Courts, § 160; [406] Insane Persons, 
; (7,8] Insane Persons, § 45; [10] Certiorari, § 26. 
,,~, 
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able, was bid for the house; that the ward's dnances were not 
80 secure that the court could be certain of his ability to 
maintain a large bouse after cessation of bis insurance dis-
ability payments on his recovery; and that the neighborhood 
was unfriendly to him, 80 tbat it might be inferred that his 
return thereto would be inimical to his best interests. 
[6] Id.-GuardiaDship.-8ale of Propel't7 of Ward-Oon4rmation 
of Sale.-On a hearing for confirmation of a guardian's sale 
of the home property of an incompetent ward. the opinion of 
the guardian's representative that be considered the sale to 
be for the ward's best interests was, in the abaence of any 
objection by the ward, properly considered by the probate 
court. 
[6] Id.-Guardianship-Sale of Property of Ward-Oon4rmation 
of Sale.-On a hearing for oonfirmation of a guardian's sale 
of the home property of an incompetent ward, tile opinion of 
the guardian's representative that he considered the sale to 
be for the ward's best interests was not necessarily altered 
by his later statement that he would not have made an etlon 
to sell the property after the filing of the ward's petition for 
restoration. 
[7] Id.-Guardianahip.-Beatoration to OompeteuC)'.-A discharge 
of an incompetent person from a state hospital acts as a 
restoration to capacity only where no guardian has been ap-
pointed. (WeIf. & Inst. Code, § 6729.) 
[8] Id.-GuardiaDship - Beatoration to OompeteuC)'. - Where a 
guardian has been appointed for an incompetent person, he 
can be restored to capacity only by the procedure under Prob. 
Code, § 1470. 
[9] GuarcIiaD and Ward-Oertiorari.-The propriety of the court's 
failure to grant a continuance on a hearing for contlrmation 
of a guardian's sale cannot be raised in a proceeding in 
certiorari to annul the order of confirmation of the sale. 
[10] Oertiorari-When Writ Lies-Oontrol of Dtscretioll.-Cer-
norm does not lie to review matters within the discretion of 
the lower court. such as 2l'anting or denying continuances. 
PROCEEDING in certiorari to annul an order of con-
1irmation of a guardian's sale of an incompetent person', 
home property. Order aftinned. 
Henry oJ. Rogers and Elden C. Friel for Petitioner. 
Cushing & Cushing, OnUinan, Trowbridge & Gorrill and 
Fred Herrington for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In this certiorari proceeding, petitioner 
Seeks annulment of an order of the probate court confirming 
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titioner was incompetent, but he has been restored to ca-
pacity since the order of confirmation of sale. Before his 
commitment he used the property both as a home and as an 
'. office where be practiced as a physician. 
Petitioner's guardian sold the property under the author-
. of section 1530 of the Probate Code: "If . . . it is for 
advantage, benefit, and best interests of the estate or 
",,_T'iI or of such members of his family as he is legally 
to support and maintain, his guardian may sell any 
his real or personal property for any of such purposes, 
to authorization, confirmation or direction by the 
as hereinafter provided." 
[1] A guardian'S sale is not effective, however, until it 
confirmed by the court. (Kier Oorp. v. Treasure Oil 00., 
Cal.App.2d 829, 842 [136 P.2d 59].) Probate Code, sec- i 
785 (see Prob. Code, § 1534) provides that "Upon hear-
the court must examine into the necessity for the sale, or 
advantage, benefit and interest of the estate in having 
sale made, and must examine the return and witnesses in 
to the sale; and if it appears to the court that good 
E.I~,.,.u existed for the sale, that the sale was legally made and 
conducted . . . the court shall make an order confirm-
sale and directing conveyances to be executed; other-
it shall vacate the sale and direct another to be had, of 
_ ... h".h notice must be given and the sale in all respects con-
as if no previous sale had taken place. . . . " The 
for confirmation of sale filed by petitioner's guardian 
that the sale was for his best interests and the court 
~rmEId. the sale on that ground. 
re1~t1'OnE!r" conceding that an order con:firming the sale of a 
property is not appealable (Guardianship of Reser, 
v ...... .a.VJ,...~u 935. 936 [135 P.2d 709]; Prob. Code, § 1630), 
annulment of the order on certiorari. His position 
as follows: "[I] t seems well settlel (and there ap-
to be no case holding to the contrary) that when a 
authorizes prescribed procedure, and the court acts 
rmt1'Al''V to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its 
arisdiictilon and certiorari will lie to correct such excesses." 
f'()(Jtmtl~" v. Superior Oourt, 13 Ca1.2d 262. 269 [89 P.2d 
The probate court derives its procedure anel. juris-
from statutes and is empowered to confirm the sale 
ward's property only if one of the statutory grounds is 
Here there is no evidence to aupport the probate 
) 
/ 
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court's finding that the sale was in petitioner's best interests, 
which was the alleged statutory ground for confirming the 
sale. The probate court therefore exceeded its jurisdiction 
and certiorari will lie to annul its order confirming the sale. 
We are unable to agree with petitioner's analysis of the 
issues presented by this case. The quotation from the Rod-
man case is not applicable to this situation. In the Rodman 
case the superior court applied cash bail to the defendant's 
fine instead of returning it to the bondsman as required by 
the Penal Code. In the opinion this court illustrated the 
meaning of the rule quoted above by citing cases in which a 
lower tribunal made an award larger than that permitted 
by statute or extended a litigant's time to plead for a period 
in excess of the time authorized by the code. (Rodman v. 
Superior Oourt, supra, at 269-270.) These acts were clearly 
in excess of the prescribed statutory authority. The present 
case is one in which the probate court made a finding and 
issued an order in strict conformity with its statutory grant 
of authority. 
According to Probate Code, section 1530, the decision to 
sell the ward's property must first be made by the guardian. 
The sale must then be presented to the probate court for con-
firmation. In the proceeding for confirmation, Probate Code. 
section 785, requires that the court shall confirm the sale, after 
hearing and examination, "if it appears to the court that 
good reason existed for the sale." [a] It is clear, therefore, 
that the determination whether there was su1Bcient evidence 
upon which to base the order lies within the discretion of the 
probate court. That determination is not reviewable on cer-
tiorari. (Howard v. 8u.perWr Oourt, 25 Ca1.2d 784. 788 
[154 P.2d 849].) 
In AbeZ16ira v. District Cour"t of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280 
[109 P.2d 942,132 A.L.R. 715], the rule stated in the Rodman 
case was shown to rest upon a broader principle. "Speak-
ing generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a 
court in any instance, whether that power be defined by 
constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or 
rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine 
of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction, in 80 far as that 
term is used to indicate that those acts may be restrained by 
prohibition or annulled on certiorari." (P. 921.) Before 
setting forth the foregoing principle, the opinion in the 
Abelleira case gave numerous examples of such excesses of 
) 
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. jurisdiction. In every case cited as illustrative, the lower 
tribunal had no power to proceed in the manner attempted. 
of the cases was concerned with a situation where, as 
. here, the court performed the very function and made the 
very finding that was intended by the statute. There is noth • 
.. ing in the Abelleira or Rodman cases, therefore, to suggest 
certiorari will lie where the only excess of power 
.'~lomp18,ineid of is the entering of an order unsupported by 
court was confronted with substantially the same 
U~"'UJ."'" in Howard v. Superior CO'Uri, 25 Ca1.2d 784 [154 
849]. In that case the probate . court, acting under 
&.,IIe'l~J.VU 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, vacated its previ-
order allowing fees for counsel. The order vacating the 
was not appealable. The attorneys to whom the 
were allowed sought a writ of certiorari to annul the 
vacating the allowance. They contended that the court 
.~lOUIld vacate an order under section 473 only on the pre-
.1Iim-illed statutory groun& and that a study of the record 
.. "ruWLU show that the court actually vacated the order on an-
_ ..... 10.... ground. Our opinion states: "The petitioners' claim 
to lack of a sufllcient affidavit of merits, inadequacy of the 
_nnwn"., . of mistake, etc., and insufficiency of the proposed 
Dbjleet;1oIlS to the allowance of fees, do not affect the jurisdic. 
of the court to act on the petition, but merely indicate 
. possibility of error in the exercise of that jurisdiction. 
motion was made upon statutory grounds and, assuming 
the trial court should have decided that the mistaken 
of the husband and his counsel was due to their negli-
failure to ascertain the facts with reference thereto, the 
can be reviewed only on appeal." (P. 788.) 
opinion distinguished those cases annulling orders of 
courtR where the orders were not made pursuant to any 
prescribed methods of procedure as defined by the 
. of Civil Procedure. "Hence it should be clear that the 
miiiCtaal situation of these cases is entirely different from. a 
.where the court is asked to act on proper grounds and 
. so act, and the claimed error is that the court abused its 
.41lf8c:retiion in finding that there was a mistake or excusable 
warranting relief under section 473. In other 
the court sets aside its final order on a ground not 
~~[)rilted or recognized by the statute, it may be acting in 
of its jurisdiction, but if it does so on a ground author-
) 
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ized by the statute, the possible insufficiency of the evidence 
to support its action does not go to its jurisdiction, but is a 
basis for review on appeal. So long as there is some show. 
ing in support of the trial court's action, the quantum of 
proof cannot be weighed on certiorari." (P. 789.) 
Petitioner contends, nevertheless, that this court should 
search the record to determine whether there is evidence to 
support the order, on the ground that the probate court is a 
court of limited jurisdiction. His theory is that a reviewing 
court should treat the decrees and orders of the probate court 
as though they had issued from an administrative agency and 
thereby demand that there be some evidence to establish the 
"jurisdictional fact." . 
It is not necessary here to determine whether or not the 
finding that the sale was in petitioner's best interests would I 
constitute a "jurisdictional fact," as that phrase is used in 
administrative board cases. [3] The probate court is not 
an administrative tribunal in any sense of the term. Al. 
though the procedure and jurisdiction of the superior court 
sitting in probate are limited by the provisions of the Probate 
Code, and in that sense "limited and special" (Texas Co. v. 
Bank of America etc. Assn., 5 Cal.2d 35, 39 [53 P.2d 127]), 
that court is not an inferior tribunal of limited jurisdiction. 
In certain probate proceedin~ the superior court has only 
the power given it by the Probate Code and no more. (Me-
Pike v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 254, 258 [30 P.2d 17].) 
This does not mean that the Legislature has created a new 
court. The Legislature has, in exactly the same manner, 
circumscribed the jurisdiction of the superior court in many 
of its other proceedings. Nevertheless it remains a court of 
general jurisdiction. 
The control by the Legislature over probate jurisdiction 
does not, therefore, lessen the dignity of decrees and orders 
of the superior court sitting on probate. " .•• the decrees 
of the probate court in matters, which like these, are clearly 
within its statutory grant of jurisdiction, have the same effect, 
and are supported by the same presumptions on collateral 
attack, as the judgments of a court of general jurisdiction." 
(Estate of Ked, 15 Cal.2d 328, 335 [100 P.2d 1045]; see, 
also, Marlenee v. Brown, 21 Cal.2d 668, 677 [134 P.2d 770]; 
Texas Co. v. Bank of America etc. Assn., supra, at 41; Burris 
v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 331, 336 (41 P. 458]; Wood v. Roach, 
125 Cal.App. 631, 635 [14 P.2d 170].) Even though the 
) 
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'probate court exercises a particular statutory jurisdiction, 
. it has many incidental powers in pursuance thereof. (See 
.Bennett v. Forrest, 24 Ca1.2d 485, 491-492 [150 P.2d 416]; 
Dobbins v. Title Guar. ~ Trust Co., 22 Ca1.2d 64, 67-69 
[136 P.2d 572).) The orders and decrees of the probate 
are treated with the same dignity on appeal as any 
orders and judgments of the superior courts. (Estate 
Caspar, 172 Cal. 147, 149 [155 P. 631]; Estate of Snow-
157 Ca1. 301, 305 [107 P. 598].) A fortiori they re-
.' .... hr .. equal treatment on certiorari. (Howard v. Superior 
25 Ca1.2d 784, 788 [154 P.2d 849]; lA1ienkamp v. 
'X1l11I!T1,nT Court, 14 Ca1.2d 293, 301 [93 P.2d 1008]; H ey-
v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. 348, 351 [49 P. 210].) 
[4] Although we have found it unnecessary to look to 
record for evidence in support of the probate court's find-
the writ of certiorari has already issued and we have the i 
~I.'ec()rd before us. It is at once apparent, upon examining 
record, that the court did not enter its order without 
basis. In fact, even if an appeal were possible 
this case it is doubtful whether we eould, under the hold-
of this court governing the scope of review of decisions 
upon conflicting evidence, reverse the order. 
Petitioner was committed to Napa State Hospital in 
1lT11nJn''V, 1946, and transferred to the United States Vet-
Administration Facility in Palo Alto in March, 1946. 
wife had previously been committed to a mental hos-
in 1940. The Anglo California Bank was appointed 
uar{11an of the estates of both incompetents and, in April, 
sold the home they owned in joint tenancy for 
The petition for confirmation of the sale was filed 
April 15, 1946. The hearing on the confirmation be-
on May 3, 1946, but two continuances were granted 
order to afford petitioner an opportunity to appear with 
.. . and present his objections to the sale. 
L. Glover, acting assistant trust officer of the bank, 
. examined on behalf of the guardian. He testified, in 
. as follows: "Q. Do you believe it to be to the advan-
and best interests of Dr. Kay's estate, and Dr. Kay, that 
property be sold' A. We do." This testimony was later 
repeated: "Q. As representative of the Bank, 
.p~eselltirlg the Bank, they feel that the property should 
~ld, that it is to the best interests of the estate, and of 
meompetcntf A. Yes." Glover was also questioned 
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with regard to the interest of petitioner's wife: "Q. You 
believe it to the best interest of the incompetent and her 
estate that the property be sold' A. Yes." 
Glover admitted on cross-examination that no effort had 
been made to lease the property. although it could readily 
have been leased. He stated also that the bank had not made 
inquiries of the hospital staff in order to ascertain peti-
tioner's condition before selling the property. In fact, the 
hospital staff had determined preliminarily on March 22d 
that petitioner was sane and competent. Further consulta-
tions were necessary, however, and he was not discharged 
as sane and competent until May 13th, after the hearing 
on confirmation of sale had begun. Glover also testified that 
petitioner had about eight or ten thousand dollars in securi-
ties in addition to disability payments from an insurance 
policy, but that these payments would cease upon petition-I 
er's recovery. According to Glover, the accepted bid constiJ 
tuted the highest price obtainable for the property. 
Petitioner produced two medical witnesses, one of them 
from the hospita1 at Palo Alto. The latter testified that 
petitioner was sane and competent and had been given a 
certificate by the hospital to that effect. He was of the opinion 
that all sane men are competent, thus demonstrating unfa- . 
miliarity with the legal distinction between competency an 
sanity (Prob. Code, § 1460), but he stated definitely tha 
the hospital staff had determined that petitioner was no 
only sane but competent to handle business a1fairs. 
The other medical witness was also of the opinion tha 
petioner was sane and competent but his opinion was quali 
:fled: "Q. And what is your opinion-- A. I believe tha 
he could go back to work and take care of himself and h' 
property. if he doesn't go too fast and too hard. Q. Do you 
think that his condition is such-in other words, would he be 
able, in your opinion, to return to active practice today' 
A. Today-not today, right away-I would advise that he 
take quite a few months further rest before going into prac-
tice. Q. At the present time, as of today, you would say 
that he is not able-- A. He might be able to get by with 
it, but I would think it better for him to go slowly. Q. And 
you think that he is able today to handle his business affairs, 
his money, his insurance, stocks and bonds, and things of that 
sort T A. That is something I would hesitate to say, be-
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be quite capable of doing one thing, and his judgment might 
. not be good in business matters. Q. Might it impede his 
~fnrt.hler recovery if he were to be saddled down now with 
JWIill\;UI.1 matters, financial worries-on the stock market, for 
and the matter of handling money' A. That 
add to his difficulties." 
. The witness had testified earlier that the sale of petition-
home would be detrimental to him, but this opinion was 
qualified on cross-examination: ceQ. I will ask you if 
read this part of the Veterans Bureau report-on the 
of the ease-these excerpts were, about the neighbors 
,~'\4A.\.1.6 messages to the District Attorney's office relative to 
:&1~;u.u,'U actions-visiting homes of neighbors throughout all 
of the night-ringing doorbells-making inquiry about 
"i\~DnE!rn7-a\ nine rooms of his home being strewn with 
decayed food lying all about the kitchen-I call 
attention to those portions of the report; you read that 
you testified' A. I did. Dr. Kay [interrupting]: 
is not true sir .... Q. When you testified on Mr. Lang's 
. attorney] question concerning the effect it would 
on Dr. Kay in not moving back into this same house, did 
ve in mind then the facts of the case concerning the 
tselIrD.pors· actions at the time referred to f A. I was not 
m,nkinLg of them particularly; I merely felt this: that any 
who was moved out of his house these days, and had 
:iftic~ul1~ getting another one, would not be affected favorably 
much e1Iect it would have on him, or how 
would do to him, I couldn't say. Q. In other words, 
would say the same of any person f A. I would say the 
. about anybody. Q. Sane or insane, competent or in-
mn~ptl~nt f A. Yes." 
trial court, after hearing the evidence and the argu-
on behalf of petitioner, the guardian, and the pur-
ordered confirmation of the sale. Subsequent to the 
of confirmation, on June 7, 1946, petitioner was re-
to capacity by an order of another department of the 
i1t'Mn'i(lr court. 
is clear even from the foregoing account of the record 
the probate court had some evidence upon which to base 
. finding that the sale was for the best interests of peti-
The evidence shows that a good price, the best ob-
I!"¥'IlUIC, was bid for the house and that petitioner's finances 
80 secure that the court could be certain of his ability 
/) 
) 
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not even disturbed on appeal, unless a clear abuse of discre-
tion is shown. (Marcucci v. Vowinckel, 164 Cal. 693, 695 
',[130 P.430].) [10] It need hardly be added that on 
certiorari we do not review matters within the discretion 
of the lower court. (8panach v. 8uperior Court, 4 Cal.2d 
447, 450 [50 P.2d 444].) 
A ward'a inability to appeal from an order confirming the 
Bale of his property does not, however, leave him wholly with-
out a remedy. The relationship of guardian and ward is a 
highly fiduciary one. The conduct of a guardian is carefully 
regulated both by statute and case law. (Prob. Code, § 1400.) 
Were the guardian as derelict in it..~ custodianship of peti-
tioner's estate as petitioner contends, it could be held to ac-
count in a proper proceeding brought on behalf of the ward. 
Were there collusion between the guardian and the purchaser, 
though there is no inkling of it in the record, petitioner could 
seek redress through an action to impose a constructive trust 
on his property. (See Restatement, Restitution, § 201.) 
The order is aftirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J.t and Sp~cet J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgmf'nt of aftirmanee, 
and I am in full accord with the views eoxpressed in the 
opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Traynor. 
In view of the showing made in the trial court I cannot 
see how it can possibly be said that the trial judge did not 
have su1Ileient evidence before him to justify his conclusion 
that the sale in question was for the best interests of the 
incompetent ward in this (".&se. It is not the function of an 
appellate court to weigh the evidence or to pass upon the 
reasonableness of conflicting inferences which may be drawn 
from the evidence even if that evidence is undisputed. Under 
our syatem. of jurisprudence the weighing of the evidence 
and the determination of the effect of the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom is solely for the trier offaet (Estate of BriI-
'101, 23 0al.2d 221 [143 P.2d 6891 ; Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U.s. 
804 [67 S.Ct. 313, 91 L.Ed. -]; TenMnt v. Peoria 41 
P.U.B. Co., 321 U.S. 29 [64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520]; Ell" 
Y. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 329 U.S. 649 I67 S.Ct. 598, 91 
L.Ed. --J; NatiMull Labor Relations Bel. v. Hearst Publi-
C4tilms, 322 U.S. 111 [64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170]; Com-
·WuioMr v. Bcotti$h Am .... Co., 323 U.s. 119 [65 S.Ct. 169, 
I. 
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89 L.Ed. 113]; UnemploY1nent Compensation Commission v. 
Aragan, 329 U.S. 143 [67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. -] ; Cardillo 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., --U.S. - [67 S.Ct. 801. 91 
',L.Ed. -]). 
!!', The rules governing an appellate court in reviewing the 
of a trial court in probate as well as other civil 
""·: .• ~a.'" are admirably stated by Mr. Justice Schauer in Estate 
Bristol, 23 Ca1.2d 221 [143 P.2d 689], as follows: 
"The rules of evidence, the weight to be accorded to the 
and the province of a reviewing court, are the 
w'l."ll contest as in any other civil case. (Estate of 
5.1~rB01:ooa:u (1910), 157 Cal. 301, 305 [107 P. 598]; Estate of 
(1924), 69 Cal.App. 16, 33 [230 P. 181].) [2] The 
as to our province is: 'In reviewing the evidence . . . 
con:flicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and 
legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold 
.' verdict if possible. It is an elementary . . . principle of 
-that when a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, 
power of the appelalte court begins and ends with a 
terJrnillat:ion as to whether there is any substantial evidence, 
[)nt,ra(llC1CCa or uncontradicted, which will support the con-
reached by the jury. When two or more inferences 
be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing 
is without power to substitute its deductions for those 
the trial court.' (Italics added.) (Crawford v. SoutherB 
Co. (1935), 3 Ca1.2d 427. 429 [45 P.2d 183].) The 
quoted is as applicable in reviewing the findings of a 
as it is when considering a jury's verdict. The critical 
in the definition is 'substantial'; it is a door which 
lead as readily to abuse as to practical or enlightened 
- [3) It is common knowledge among judges and 
that many cases are determined to the entire satis-
trial judges or juries, on their factual issues, by evi-
is overwhelming in its persuasive'Ress but which 
lin-nUl" relatively unsubstantial---if it can be reffected at 
a phonographic record. Appellate courts, therefore, if 
any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evi-
to sustain a finding, should resolve that doubt in favor 
finding; and in searching the record and exploring 
inf'ereinCl:lS which may arise from what is found there, to 
whether such doubt or conflict exists, the court 
,be realistic and practical. Upon such view of the law 
hold that any essential finding in this case is un-
DlKltrted.." [Emphasis added.] 
) 
) 
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I am in full ac\!ord with the views expressed in the fore-
going excerpt. These views were again restated by Mr. 
Justice Schauer with exceptional force and clarity in his dis-
senting opinion in the case of Isenberg v. California Emp. 
Stab. Com., ante, p. 34 at page 46 [180 P.2d 11], where 
he said: "The functions of trial and appellate courts are 
constitutionally disparate and no role should be more scrupu-
lously observed by courts of .Appeal than that in their ap-
pellate work they should not encroach upon or usurp a 
trial court function. The resolution of factual questions 
including the detennination of the inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence whether that evidence be documentary or 
undisputed or otherwise, is in a major sense exclusively the 
province of the trial court (or of th~ jury). It is exclusive 
in the trial court (or jury) in the sense that the appellate 
court is given no right to resolve factual conflicts or to in-
dulge its preference as to the selection of inferences from 
the evidence. It is only where clearly there is no substan-
tial evidence from which essential inferences can be drawn 
that the appellate court may properly interfere in a factual 
sense; and its interference then should be· both in fonn and 
in substance by a statement of the law not a declaration of 
fact. Any other course by an appellate court is dictatorial 
in nature and tends toward depriving litigants of the consti-
tutional standards of a fair trial." 
In the light of the foregoing pronouncements as to the 
function of an appellate court in reviewing a factual deter-
mination by a trial court there can be no escape from the 
conclusion reached in the majority opinion. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-uTo thus interpret law doth 
cuckold justice." The "dim and odious annals of the past" 
(Lytton Strachey, Elizabeth and Essex) are, indeed, come 
down to date. Is an adult man who is sane and competent 
in fact, who has served his country as well as his community 
as a physician and surgeon, who is convicted of no crime, 
who owes no debts, who has thousands of dollars of cash in 
the hands of a bank which had been appointed his guardian, 
who owns a house which he built on a lot which he bought 
with funds which he earned, who is possessed of ample in-
come, who needs and wishes to keep the house to use as an 
office for his practice and as a home for himself and his two 
young daughters, but who at one time was mentally ill for 
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'it days, who, it is res judicata, had recovered nnd was "sane 
. and competent" at the time of the court order here involved, 
h61pless to prevent a sale by his "guardian" of his property' 
the shame of our system of jurisprudence the majority 
this court so hold. 
Willard E. Kay, a physician and surgeon, the husband 
Kay and the father of Nancy Ann and Kathryn, 
has honorably ministered in the armed forces as well 
his civilian community, about ten years ago built Ii 
at the northwest corner of Scott and Broadway in San 
He built it for himself and his wife Nancy and 
two young daughters. Nancy became incompetent 
years ago. Dr. Kay used the house both as family 
I!I!DCLen<:e and professional office. On January 14, 1946, he 
adjudged mentally ill and was committed to the Napa 
On January 22. 1946, the Anglo California Na-
Bank of San Francisco was appointed guardian of his 
(It also, previously, had been appointed to act a..q 
of Nancy's estate.) Fifty-nine days later, on 
22, 1946, the sta1f of the Veterans Administration 
to which institution Dr. Kay had been transferred I 
20, 1946, examined him and found him "sane and 
1Il1J.etlmt" This ifI not disputed. He was, nevertheless, 
retained under examination. On April 6, 1946, 
was again "presented . . . to the staff and at that 
was also considered sane and competent; there was 
,case review on May 1st, 1946 ... at which he wa..q 
. considered competent, and the last review was on the 
'of May, at which time he was discharged from the hos-
'as sane and competent." He was at that time (May 
) 
) "Discharged to his own custody" to take care of 
,affairs and was given a formal certUicate of com-
as provided for by statute. (WeIf. & Inst. Code, 
'to May 16, 1946, Dr Kay filed his petition for legal 
timLticln to adjudicated competency. He alleged among 
things that "Ever since May 1, 1946, petitioner has 
and he now is sane, and competent and of sound mind, 
'entitled to be restored to mental competency and 
and ever since said date, he has been, and now is, 
_.I"~~"V of caring for himself and of managing his 
and his estate, and is entitled to an adjudication to 
' .. effeet." On June 7, 1946, all the above allegations were 
) 
) 
230 ESTATE OF KAy [30 C.2d 
adjudicated to be true. Not one allegation in that ptltition 
was challenged by Dr. Kay's guardian, by the trial judge, 
by Mr. Edel Epstein who had n deal pending with the guard-
ian to purchase Dr. Kay's property at private sale, or by 
anyone else. Nevertheless, with thnt petition pending hear-
ing, the trial court undertook. on l\Iay 16, 1946, to confirm 
(apparently the trial judge believed that he was merely re-
fusing to "set aside") a sale of Dr. Kay's property, over his 
protests, to Mr. Epstein. The sale was confirmed for a price 
of $20,200 for Dr. Kay's interest ($40,400 for the entire 
property); the property had previously, by the court ap-
praiser, been appraised at $25.000 for Dr. Kay's interest 
($50,000 for the entire property). The property had not 
been offered publicly or listed with any broker. It was offered 
by the guardian at private sale to Mr. Epstein and the guard.-
ian undertook to make the sale to Mr. Epstein for $40,400 
while the property stood appraised at $50,000. That sale 
was undertaken by the guardian (petition for confirmation 
filed) on April 15, 1946. It will be remembered that ac-
cording to the undisputed evidence Dr. Kay, in the opinion 
of the Veterans Administration Hospital staff, had recovered 
and was "sane and competent" as early as March 22, 1946. 
more than three weeks before the guardian even filed the 
petition for confirmation and nearly two months before the ! 
"confirmation." The excuse stated by the guardian for 
offering to sell under the circumstances shown was that it 
did not know that Dr. Kay bad recovered. Its representa-
tive admitted that no effort had been made to ascertain his 
condition. Nevertheless, on May 16, 1946, assertedly under 
the mistaken belief that the property had already been sold 
and that it did not have the right "to set aside the sale," the 
trial (probate) judge confirmed the sale. This egregious error 
and failure to pursue jurisdiction, the majority hold, cannot 
be rectified. 
None of the essential facts are disputed. This is not a 
case wherein, there being a conflict in the testimony or in the 
inferences to be drawn from the testimony or documents or 
! circumstances shown, it is the duty of the reviewing court 
I to sustain the inferences and conclusions of the trial court. 
The holding in Estate of Bristol (1943), 23 Ca1.2d 221, 223 
[143 P.2d 689], inferentially relied upon, although not cited, 
in the majority opinion, has no pertinency here. That case 
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!"Jr. are confronted not merely with a paucity of evidence to 
!II1PPort a finding which was made but, more particularly, 
with an overwhelming, undisputed, affirmative showing that 
! the act of the probate court exceeded its "defined power" as 
tI,,!f(let1lD.ea by . . . express statutory declaration." ( AbeZleira 
1Jifl~ncf Courl of AppeaZ (1941), 17 Ca1.2d 280, 291 [109 
942, 132 A.L.R. 715].) It has frequently been held, 
tilt1'iUbstmce, that if from all the facts only a single inference 
one conclusion may be drawn, then such single inference 
. a fact in the case and the "one conclusion" must be 
p ...... ""'-~ as a matter of law. (Baugh v. Rogers (1944), 24 Cal. 
200; 206 [148 P.2d 633, 152 A.L.R. 1043]; Perguica v. 
tfitlrlus~~na' Ace. Com. (1947), 29 Cal.2d 857, 859 [179 P.2d 
PieZds v. Sanders (1947), 29 Ca1.2d 834, 842-843 
.2d 684]. Justice Traynor, on another occasion (Mos-
Arde~ Parms Co. (1945), 26 Cal.2d 213 [157 P.2d 
A.L.R. 872], concurring opinion, p. 223) stated his 
be that "[I] f reasonable men could not differ as to 
. the evidence does or does not establish the existence 
the court will not submit the issue to the jury.") 
an'the essential facts are either undisputed or are res 
Only one conclusion in respect to departure from 
~risClictional procedure can be drawn by a reasonable mind. 
same rule of law which was followed in the Abelleira 
applied here the order rendered must be annulled. 
undisputed that there was no necessity for the sale . 
. was at all times concerned in receipt of a cash in-
some $500 or $600 a month from insurance policies 
was not disputed that such income would continue as 
he remained unable to carry on his practice. He had 
:cJ'Qli1&D.(lS of dollars of cash on hand. It is also undisputed 
was possessed of some $8,000 to $15,000 worth of 
. . securities. No cash was needed in the 
the personal property securities were not offered 
The real property was never offered for rent j the 
. hetd it vacant. 
was inco~petent for but a few weeks, or at most, 
a legalistic sense, months. As previously noted the 
was appointed on or about January 22, 1946. On 
22, 1946, Dr. Kay was pronounced sane and compe-
the hospital staff; on May 13, he was discharged and 
formal certificate of competency; and on June 7, 
.form&lly, adjudged that he was then, and at all times 
) 
) 
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subsequent to May 1, 1946, had been, llsane, competent and 
of sound mind and . . . entitled to be restored to mental com-
petency and ever since said date, he has been, and now is, 
fully capable ... of managing his dam and his estate." 
In apparent haste to sell Dr. Kay's property before he was 
fully restored to legal competency, the petition for confirma-
tion was flIed April 15, 1946, without consulting him and 
without inquiry as to his then condition of health. The peti-
tion alleges, among other things, that "the interest of this 
estate in said parcel has been appraised at $25,000.00, but 
your petitioner is informed and believes, and therefore al- i 
leges, that said appraisement is too high, and therefore re- I 
spectfully requests that a new appraisement be forthwith I 
had. (6) That said sale was made directly with said pur-
chaser [Edel R. Epstein] without the employment or assist-
ance of any broker or agent and no real estate broker's com-
mission is payable." Such petition was set for hearing on 
May 3, 1946. This was some six weeks after Dr. Kay had been 
found sane and competent by the staff at the Veterans Ad-
ministration Hospital but while he was still under observa-
tion there. On that day a telegram which had been received 
by the clerk of the court on the preceding day, was called to 
the attention of the trial judge. The telegram purported to 
come from the brother-in-law of Dr. Kay and read as fol-
lows: "Dr. Kay's home is not to be sold or sale confirmed 
in court without his personal consent. Arrangements were 
made for his release on May 1st from Veterans Hospital. 
Mrs. Kay may arrive A-fay 2nd. Dr. Kay's condition was 
only temporary and not permanent and is well now. They 
must be allowed to occupy the house and sale must not be 
confirmed until and unless Dr. Kay consents to it. Mean-
while confirmation can be continued two or three weeks or 
a month." The trial judge remarked, "I really see no reason 
why this matter should be postponed. I can't pay any atten-
tion to telegrams from somebody that knows nothing about 
the circumstances, or from relatives. . . . We cannot be post-
poning these sales for trivial matters . . . I understand Dr. 
Kay was-before Dr. Kay was committed, the whole neigh. 
borhood was out hiring attorneys-he was firing shots through 
the ceiling-isn't that true T [The record before us is devoid 
of evidence to this effect.] •.. This incompetency has been 
going on for a long time, hasn't itt" "Mr. Herrington: Not 
Dr. Kay-it is only three or four months old." "The Court: 
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, WeD, that Us some time. .•. " The matter was, however, con-
dnued uDtil Yay 10, and at that time Dr. Kay and hUs coun-
, eel appeared and opposed the eonfirmation of sale. Among 
" Other things stated to the court the following appears: "Dr. 
Xq, who Us one of the incompetents here, Us in court, as 
.' . Honor &aid. We have been informed by the medical 
or by a member of the medical staff, of the Veterans 
~;~lDWllistJratil[)n Hospital in Palo Alto, that Dr. Kay should 
.'.reat;ored, and that he Us no longer incompetent, and that 
riJ_l8dings should be commeneed for the purpose of having 
eoJI1J)81ten4yY adjudicated, and having him restored. 
are on behalf of Dr. Kay for a continuance 
matter, and that the sale either not be confirmed or 
. be continued for a suftleient period of time to eMble 
"ftC:otIlDUS,..J to 1uwe 0,.. opporlu.ifll 10 be restored. 
The reason· thUs request Us made Us because 
and he has no plaee to go and live and have 
_', ~'_ ... since he is a practieing physieian-he was before 
. an ineompetent--and he asks the Court 
."~ntil!1ue. the matter, or to diaapprove the sale for that 
We believe that it Us within the Court's discretion 
that, to enable him to save his home. Legally, he is in-
.:nJ)4iJte11t and inSane today, but in a few days, from the 
~~o.nnation that we have, he will be declared competent .••• " 
CoUrt: . . • I think the only thing I can do, to pre-
11&8 rigAf' 01 Mr. CuZZiMfto OM Ail clie.fa [the Epsteins] 
an., they have some rights-thia sale is legitimate, in 
the natural sentiment we have about taking a home 
I think a few days' continuance should be 
~ . " •. And I want a substantial showing at that time-
. ~t to hear what Us going to be done, and all that; 
some substantial showing at that time." (Italics 
There Us in the record not the slightest basis for 
either the prospective purchasers or their attar-
aD.,. "rights" in the premises ,to be "preserved." 
Dr. Kay and his wife, Nancy, who had rights which 
have been the primary coneem of the court and 
16, the hearing resumed. At that time it appeared 
only had Dr. Kay been released from the hospital 
'restonld to sanity and competency in the opinion of the 
. staff, but that he had filed a petition for restoration 
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such petition had been set for June 6, only some three weeks 
away. The petition averred that petitioner was in fact sane 
and competent as of the date of its filing and that he had 
been sane and competent "ever since May 1, 1946." As pre-
viously noted none of its allegations was challenged by any-
one and on June 7, they were adjudicated true. 
The evidence upon which the majority rely to support the 
jurisdiction of the trial court in its purported confirmation 
of the sale-actually, its denial of rescission-is that of one 
Myron L. Glover, an employee of the trust department of the 
guardi:m bank. In response to leading questions he under-
took to state the naked belief and feeling, not his personal 
opinion, of his corporate employer as to the advantage to Dr. 
Kay and his estate of making the sale in qUeGion. He gave 
no reason, whatsoever, for the "belief" or "feeling" of the 
bank except the indicated basic belief that Dr. Kay was in-
sane and incompetent and would remain so indefinitely. The 
transcript shows: "Q. Do you believe it to be to the advan-
. tage and best interest of Dr. Kay's estate, and Dr. Kay, tbt 
the property be sold' A- We do. . . . Q. As representative 
of the Bank, representing the Bank, they feel that the prop-
erty should be sold, that it is to the best interest of the estate, 
and of the incompetenU A. Yes .... Q. (Mr. Lang) I will ask 
you if you made any investigation or caused any investigation 
to be made as to the possible recovery of Dr. Kay on or before 
April 15, 1946 [the date the petition for confirmation was 
med] , • _ . A. No. Q. Did you have any reason to make 
any investigation at that time f Had anyone informed you 
that Dr. Kay had made any application for restoration' A-
No. If there had been, we would h.ave made no effort to selZ I 
the property. Q. You did not know that he was found to be 
sane and competent by the medical staff on March 22' . . • 
A. No, we had no knowledge!' (Italics added.) 
It is thus obvious that the "belief" of the bank clerk as 
to the "feeling" of the bank was based on the further erro-
neous belief that Dr. Kay continued insane and incompetent 
when in fact he had recovered. The attitude of the bank on 
the final hearing (May 16, 1946) in relation to the question 
of Dr. Kay's restoration to legal competency, is reflected by 
the following passage from the transcript: "[By Mr. Her-
rington.] Mr. Cullinan is here representing the purchasers, 
and Mr. Lang is also here, and I think your Honor has the 
I picture in mind from last week. AI far as the petition for 
. J 
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""'ortIno., 1 might say that the Bank's position on that is 
neutral' if the doctor can establish that he has recovered 
and is ~tit1ed to handle his own affairs, the Bank will be 
'Qm1 too happy to cooperate and abide by any order the 
'Court may make in that connection. We do not expect to 
.. 'c,ppo8e f1uJf at all." (Italics added.} But the effort to con-
"ftmi the sale went on. 
"! BVidence was introduced which, without any substantial 
. . established that Dr. Kay had in fact largely recovered 
and strength, that he was then sane and competent 
. ShoUld avoid overworking and worry for some months. 
undisputed that he had been released; as restored. to 
'r~:"f+ .... and competency, to return to his own home, that he 
able to resume to some extent his practice of medicine, 
................. he needed and wanted his home place in which to 
and maintain his family and his omce. The property 
kept vacant during the months that Dr. Kay had 
in the hospital and, upon Dr. Kay's recovery and restora-
his guardian refused to allow him to enter it. 
. is to be remembered that we are here concerned' with 
gUJl\rdlaIlSbllp matter and with the limited power of the 
sitting probate, in a special statutory proceeding • 
. C&IlI8 in modern legal literature, in California or else-
;:I!~\~.~". ,.';;which indulges hyper-technicality to a similar end 
'. ,~, the extent of the majority opinion in this ease, has 
'cited. Section 785 (Prob. Code) declares that "Upon 
. the court must examine into the necessity for the 
the advantage, benefit and interest of the estate in 
·the sale made, and mud examine the return and wit-
. in relation to the sale .... " (Italics added.) In 
tbau'!it'tl' Yo District Court of AppeaZ (1941), IUpra. 17 Cal. 
this court said; "The concept of jurisdiction 
number of ideas of similar character, some 
~~ltal to the nature of any judicial system, some de-
. 'the requirement of due process,. some determined 
. ~nstitutional or statutory structure of a particular 
some based upon mere procedural rules originally 
for convenience and efficiency, and by precedent made 
aneJatc)ry and jurisdictional. Speaking generally, any acts 
exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, 
D41tJlEIl' that power be defined by constitutional provision, 
statutory declaration, or rules developed by the 
and followed nnder the doetrine of stare decisis, nre 
,01. ~etloD, ~ 10 f~ as tba.t ... II· ...... 
I 
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indicate that those acts may be restrained by prohibition 
or annulled on cert·iora,.i." 
It is Hornbrook law that the jurisdiction of a probate court, 
as such, is limited and special. (Olcese v. Superior Court, 
(1930), 210 Cal. 556, 568 [292 P. 964]; Haynes v. Meeks 
(1862),20 Cal. 288, 312, 314; Janes v. Throckmorton (1881), 
57 Cal. 368, 387; 21 Am.Jur. § 582, p 709. See, also, Estate 
of Davis (1902), 136 Cal. 590, 597 [69 P. 412]; McPike v. 
Superior Court (1934), 220 Cal. 354, 258 [30 P.2d 17]; 
Texas Co. v. Bank of America (1935), 5 Cal.2d 35, 39 [53 
P.2d 127].) In Rodman v. Superior Court (1939), 13 Ca1.2d 
262, at 269 [89 P.2d 109], this court said: "An examination 
of the numerous cases which deal with this problem impels l 
the conclusion that some confusion exists with reference to 
what constitutes an excess, and what constitutes an error, in 
the exercise of jurisdiction. However, it seems well settled 
(and there appears to be no ease holding to the contrary) 
that when a statute authorizes prescribed procedure, and the 
court acts contrary to the authority thlUl conferred, it ha..~ 
exceeded its jurisdiction, and certiorari will lie to correct 
such excess." See, also, Spreckels S. Co. v. Industrial Acc. 
Com. (1921),186 Cal. 256, 260 fI99 P. 8]. There is no appeal. 
in a guardianship proceeding, from an order confinning a 
sale of property. (Guardianship of Reser (1943), 57C81. 
App.2d 935. 936 [135 P.2d 709].) 
The trial court. seeming to be of the view that the pur. 
chaser acquired vested rights as of the date of his bid and 
that those "rights" must prevail unless and until Dr. Kay 
proved some "grounds" for rescinding or "setting aside the 
sale," placed the burden on Dr. Kay to prove- grounds 
for "setting aside the sale," rather than on the guardian or 
Mr. Epstein to prove existence of jurisdictiona] facts neces-
sary to warrant confirming the projected sale. The court 
further held that the recovery of sanity and competency by 
Dr. Kay was not a sufticient ground for "setting aside the 
sale," that the sale could not be set aside or confirmation 
I withheld "for the grounds that we have heard here today" 
/ and concluded the hearing with these words: "I think the 
showing here is absolutely insufticient. I have heard all this 
evidence here today just fo accommodate those who came 
here, and to give everyone a hearing-l do not think it 
6fJects the iuues of the case af all. The order is that this 
sa]e is confirmed." (Italics added.) 
Regardless, therefore, of the sufliciency of the evidence 
'otherwis8 to show jurisdiction to confirm the sale, it 1Dl-
! 
) 
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uiistakably appears that the probate court in ordering that 
"this sale is confirmed" was not actually complying, in any 
aense. with section 785 of the Probate Code but was holding 
merely that as a matter of law the recovery of Dr. Kay was 
tDiumcient to constitute, and wholly immaterial as, a ground 
, .' "setting aside" the sale which, in its conception, had 
alieac:l, been made by the guardian to Mr. Epstein. As re-
~IIoWIAq indicated by the trial judge he was concerning him-
not with a diligent inquiry into the best interests of Dr. 
and his estate, as the statute requires, but rather with 
.·lUIotelrtiIlg the "rights" of those whom he considered already 
purchasers. He said. "I think the only thing I can do, 
.<;+1\'··'''....,'''''...,171'1 the rights of Mr. Cullinan and his clients [Mr. and 
~........... li'!!ft ... ·...... -after all, they have some rights-this sale 
le.z:itiInate, in spite of the natural sentiment we have about 
a home from somebody. I think a few days' con-
::Wl'\mnce could be granted: and ... I don't want any of 
certificates that I get here, they are of very little weight. 
anybody is likely to be deprived of his rights, that is 
pOEBtl()n that this court is going to take .... MR. HEIuuNo-
Does your Honor care to appoint doctors' THE COURT: 
is nothing before the court now. This is a case where 
these parties were committed. . . . At the time this 
s1£l)m1~ffe:d for sale was there any question then about his 
tijtm,<l1D for recovery here' ... " (Italics added.) 
representative then testified that at the time the 
.• was otfered by the bank to Mr. Epstein, the bank 
know that Dr. Kay had recovered his reason. The 
then appears: ceQ. [by MR. LANG] I will ask you 
any investigation or caused any investigation 
as to the possible recovery of Dr. Kay on or be-
15, 1946' MR. IIEruuNGTON: I will object to the 
,on the ground-- THE CoURT: Do you think that 
duty of the Bank-before con1irmation of a sale-
should go-when a man is in snme institution, and 
regularly committed-that it is the ituty of any 
,go, before property is otfered for sale, and find out 
there is a possibility that this man may be restored 
,00IU.D4~tel1Cv; is that your question' 1m LANG: Yes, your 
in view of the fact that it is home and his castle . 
... ""'Vl .... : That is not the point at aU here-I do not want 
'this sentiment in this case about a man's home being 
[.ealrue-lve had all that up here before. Let us get down 
.' legal points. ••• I am giving a great deal of time • 
'.,". 
I 
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this case-this type of testimony would be appropriate on 
an application for restoration, which is not before the Court 
at all at this time [it was filed and pending, awaiting hear-
ing], but I did not want these doctors to come up here with-
out hearing them. Of course, they have not impressed me 
that much on the issue here, which is the question of thi~ 
confirmation of sale-that is the issue. MR. LANG: The whole 
question is whether the sale would be detrimental-I inti-
mated or suggested that it would seem to me the fair thing 
to do would be tolease this property out. THE COURT: What 
about all the legal steps that have been taken here' The sale 
was advertised; the bids were received; the Court called for 
further bids-all of those things have been done. I just went 
out of my way to do what I suppose I had no authority to do, 
over Mr. Cullinan's objection here, to go into this matter; 
and upon your personal request to me the other day-you 
told me you had been retained in the case; but whether those 
things affect the L'!Sue here is another question .... MR. HER-
RINGTON: ... The question seems to be: is this sale, as it now 
stands, for the advantage, benefit, and best interest of Dr. 
Kay' MR. LANG: That is the whole question. It has been ' 
my procedure, or at least it has been the custom of myself 
and the Bank of America or the Anglo California Bank-
I can't say the Anglo California-to make an investigation 
before going into a matter like this. THE COURT: I never 
heard of such a cmtom. . . . MR. CULLINAN: There is not 
much for me to say in addition to what I have already said 
at previous hearings-this is a difficult time for purchasers to 
find places, and when they find a place and put a lot of money 
and obligate themselves for the title search and make ar-
rangements for contractors, painters, and other trades to 
fix the place up-- MR. LANG: You know, Mr. Cullinan, don't 
you, that all sales are subject to the confirmation of the Court' 
THE COURT: But not for the grounds that we have heard 
here today . ... I think the showing here is absolutely in.su.ffi-
cient. I have heard all this e1Jidence here today just to ac-
commodate those who came here, and to give everyone a 
hearing-l do not think it affects the issues of the case at all. 
The order is that this sale is confirmed." (Italics added.) 
It is manifest from the record hereinabove quoted that 
the trial judge did not comply with the procedure prescribed 
by section 785 of the Probate Code and that he wholly ignored 
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aecnon 40 of the Civil Code.· He made no pretense of examin-
ing "into the necessity for the sale, or the advantage, benefit 
and interest of the estate in having the sale made" in rela-
tion to the interest of Dr. Kay as a living competent person, 
or in relation to the "sale" as a mere contemplated or pro-
'posed, rather than a consummated project. He considered 
. that the sale had already been made; that the purchaser had 
}~rights" which it was the court's duty to "preserve"; that 
E,,;the proceeding was one whereby Dr. Kay sought to "set 
. !aside" the sale; and that he was passing on the legal suffi-
of grounds for "setting aside the sale." He held 
grounds insufficient as a matter of law to "set aside 
sale"; he did not comply with section 785 of the Probate 
; and the order sought to be annulled is not in actuality 
which the court in this proceeding had jurisdiction 
• It,is unmistakably an order denying rescission of 
: court denominated a "legitimate" sale. 
course. under our procedure a sale is not made until 
,. (Estate of Rule (1944), 25 Ca1.2d 1, 10 [152 
1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319].) Mr. Epstein had not bought 
'K:&y's property; he had merely offered to buy it. The 
i!'· .... DW~. did not have before it, and did not have jurisdiction 
'pass upon, any issue 88 to rescission or "Retting aside" 
,~' otherwise binding sale. Yet it did not assume to pass 
any other issue. (Whether mandate should issue, upon 
. application, to require the court to exercise the juris-
given it by section 785 of the Probate Code, is not 
us.) It is obvious that the court did not follow the 
_dUl~' prescribed by section 785 of the Probate Code; 
Ant:A1"f1lt no order whatsoever based on that procedure; 
a settlement of issues projected by that statute; 
the order it did enter, by which it undertook to deny 
IlCissi()D or "setting aside" of what it erroneously con-
be an accomplished sale, iswholJy void. AB such. it 
annuned. 
"~5id8iJ.Y the Civil Code provides that "After his incapacity has 
" determined, a persoD of unsound mind can make no 
other contract ... until his restoration to capacity. But 
from the l!'-edical superintendent or resident physician of 
to which such person may have been committed, show-
leD. person had been discharged therefrom, cured and restored 
shall eetablish the presumption of legal capacity in such per-
time of such discharge." Here Dr. Kay had been released 
competent"; he had been provided with the formal caniil· 
AJ>i8cJ:l.&J'lle of InAne Person as Recovered" and the document 

